In the Crystal Ball: Outside the EU and What the UK Will Find There by Kende, Tamás
On June 23 2016 the people of the United Kingdom voted – in a  legally non-binding but
politically imperative referendum – for the UK to discontinue membership of the European
Union. 
David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, had promised in 2013 a referendum on the
United Kingdom’s EU membership before the end of 2017. In 2016, his government negotiated
a series of EU reforms with the other member-states with special provisions for the UK. The result
of the referendum of June 23 2016 was in favour of the withdrawal of the UK from the European
Union, notwithstanding the outcome of those negotiations. 
While the reasons for the decision of the British electorate are not entirely clear and
probably cannot be narrowed down to a  single factor, it appears likely that the majority
specifically rejected the free movement of workers, a key component of the single market. Based
on statistics from 2014, there were only 2.9 million EU nationals in Britain. That is no more
than 5% of the UK’s population yet the Leave campaign succeeded in convincing a sizeable part
of the electorate about the tenability of immigration. 
Writing the day after the result was announced, the leader column of The Irish Times stated
that the electorate had fallen for an ‘easily sold, demagogic delusion’.1 All elections are thus to
some degree. But promises made in a general election generally have to be delivered on, or the
promisor gets punished at the subsequent elections. In the case of a referendum, it is more
complicated to come back for those who made those promises. Yet, the fact is that news is
leaking about Brexit being a bad deal for the UK: the UK’s office for budget responsibility
predicted Brexit would blow a €70 billion hole in the nation’s finances and the Institute for Fiscal
Studies said Brexit would see real wages lower in 2021 than they had been in 2008.
Following the referendum, Prime Minister David Cameron resigned and a new Prime
Minister, Theresa May was named and the entire cabinet reshuffled. Prime Minister May has
not yet submitted to the EU the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU. In October 2016,
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however, she indicated that such a decision would be submitted in March 2017. She also
launched the slogan ‘Brexit means Brexit’, which is likely to mean that the UK will exit the EU
regardless of the results of the negotiations with the other 27 member states and regardless of
the potential economic consequences.2 As such, the slogan seems to indicate that she will not
submit the results of the negotiations for approval to by the Houses Parliament or by refer en -
dum. Although up until recently, the PM declined ‘to give parliament a formal vote on the
decision to trigger the Brexit process or any deal she achieves, saying it is the government’s
prerogative’,3 the situation may possibly be altered by the recent ruling of the High Court (if it will
be sustained by the Supreme Court.). The High Court held in its decision dated November 3th
2016 that the Government does not have the authority (stemming from the Royal Prerogative)
for a notification sent under Article 50 of the TFEU relating to the withdrawal from membership
(see below). The question shall be decided soon on appeal and its outcome may have an effect
of the internal constitutional and, consequently, political setup if it requires the Parliament to
formally decide on the notification.
In this paper, in the first part we shall briefly review the withdrawal of the UK from the
perspective of the EU Treaties, then move on to present the objectives the UK may seek to
achieve by the withdrawal from the EU as it has been expressed during the Brexit campaign or
since then. We then examine several possible options available for the UK and the EU to regulate
their cooperation. Finally, we shall finish with a quick analysis of these options mainly from the
aspect of their feasibility and political expedience.
I Brexit: The Unprecedented Withdrawal from the EU from the
Perspective of the Treaties
Withdrawal from the EU is unprecedented, as no member state has until now withdrawn from
the integration process. Some bulwarks of the neo-functionalist academic literature claimed
that member states were locked in the integration process and so turning back was not a feasible
option, politically or economically.4 Before the Lisbon Treaty there was no formal procedure for
a withdrawal and, therefore, the Vienna Convention of the law of Treaties would have applied.
However, since the entry into force of Lisbon, Article 50 of the TFEU regulates the withdrawal
procedure.
When the UK submits its decision to withdraw from the EU, it needs to refer to and its
declaration needs to be based on Article 50. This Article provides a legal basis and the procedure
to be followed in the event of withdrawal. The relevant parts of the Article state:
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1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own
constitutional requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the
light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an
agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the
framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance
with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on
behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the
European Parliament.
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the
withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless
the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to
extend this period.
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council
representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European
Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.
5. ….5
Paragraph 2 provides for a procedure which allows the negotiation of a withdrawal treaty (WT).
The notice for withdrawal is a trigger event that inevitably leads to either the conclusion of
a withdrawal treaty followed by the withdrawal or to the withdrawal without a treaty.6
During the negotiations on ‘Brexit’, the UK would remain a member-state and continue to
participate in EU activities with the exception provided for in Article 50(4).7 This exception
logically provides that the UK’s representative in the European Council and the Council – as well
as the bodies preparing for the meetings of these bodies, such as the Permanent Representatives
Committee (COREPER) – will not participate on the EU side in negotiations with the UK on
Brexit. 
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Interestingly, although the EU has been created by an international treaty between its
prospective member states, a withdrawal will not be concluded with all other member-states
and, therefore, it would not require ratification by all. It will be concluded by the UK and the EU’s
institutions. The Council would approve it on behalf of the Union, ‘acting by a qualified majority,
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament’. 
On the other hand, the withdrawal will require a revision of the EU treaties, to be based on
article 48 TEU, requiring the agreement of all the remaining member states.
Given the complexities of such a withdrawal and the many alternatives which need to be
taken into account, it is very likely that the two years allowed for negotiating withdrawal will not
be sufficient. In such a case, Article 50(3) allows for an extension of that period, subject to the
agreement of the UK and to a unanimous decision of the European Council. If negotiations
between the UK and the EU on Brexit are not concluded before the two year deadline, the UK
would exit the EU without a treaty and thereafter it would be forced to negotiate and conclude
an agreement like any other third party. The conclusion of this agreement negotiated after the
two year period would be subject to unanimity in the Council [Article 218(8) of the TFEU].
This is why the UK has not yet – at the time of writing this paper – notified the European
Council of its intention to withdraw from the EU, although the new Prime Minister May has
clearly indicated that the decision of the referendum will be followed (‘Brexit is Brexit’). The UK
is apparently trying to extend the two year deadline by not notifying its intention to withdraw
until the UK administration has in its own opinion fully prepared for the withdrawal. This – as
is suggested in the press – is not likely to be before the first half of 2017 so Brexit is likely to take
place at some point in 2019.
The agenda and the precise subject of the Brexit negotiations are further blurred by the
fact that no public agenda exists as to the strategy of the UK Government relating to the
negotiations. The UK government – partly led by Brexiteer politicians – seems to underestimate
the difficulty of the negotiations lying ahead and the economic risks associated with it, and is
playing up the potential economic benefits of the UK being on its own. Prime Minister May has
recently suggested that the UK would be open to conclude a transitional arrangement with the
EU in order to avoid the uncertainties that could occur before the complex task of establishing
the post-Brexit relations with EU and third countries are finalized.8 However, unintentional
revelations from the UK Ministry preparing the Brexit seems to suggest that the UK is not keen
on a transitional arrangement.9
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II What does the UK Wish to Achieve with the Withdrawal 
from the EU?
The obvious UK priority is to obtain as much access as possible to the EU’s internal market
(actually, for the most part, the EEA’s market). In other areas of EU policy, some transitional
measures would be appropriate. This is because the economies of the UK and the rest of the EU,
after more than 40 years of membership, have become closely intertwined and interdependent.
This is also because, as EU citizens, about two million British people live, work or are retired in
other EU member-states, while some two and a half million other EU citizens live in the UK.
All this makes it clear that the UK would have no interest in waiting to negotiate an agreement
until after it had formally withdrawn from the EU. It would have a strong interest in negotiating
speedily while still a member, and thus being able to benefit from Article 50 TEU special
procedure.
While the ‘Leave’ campaign had a fairly coherent set of campaign slogans as to why the UK
would need to leave the EU, the UK government has not, until the time of writing this paper,
penned a coherent policy document on the aims of the UK with its withdrawal. If the UK
government was to internalise in full the campaign arguments and promises of the ‘Leave’
campaign then of its commitments to a fully sovereign UK, with no unconditional immigration
from the EU, with the rights of UK banks preserved, with more flexibility in trade negotiations
and with substantially less payment by the UK into the EU budget emerge.
For these promises to materialise, it seems the UK would look for a withdrawal treaty with
the EU in which the free movement of persons would be curtailed but the freedom of movement
of goods, capital and services would not. Goods would move freely while there would not be
a common external trade policy. In this set of promises, the UK’s legislation would remain fully
coherent with the EU rules in order for the remaining three freedoms to work seamlessly,
although the UK parliament would be free to pass any legislation it, as a sovereign decision
maker, wishes to pass. Fulfilling these promises would mean that the UK government has been
able to calm the electorate and minimize the negative economic impact of Brexit on the UK
economy by keeping the UK and within it the City of London – on its terms – in the single
market as far as goods, services and capital are concerned. This solution is a form of ‘soft Brexit’
as the term was coined – a solution which allows the UK to exit the EU but leaves its economy
firmly anchored in its single market – but not the only form of ‘soft Brexit’ imaginable.
In order to achieve this maximalist set of contradictory aims (access to the single market,
no free movement, no contribution to the EU budget, no oversight by the Luxembourg Court),
the UK would need to undertake a Herculean negotiating task, as some of these aims mutually
exclude each other or, with regard to some of these aims, the EU’s current leaders exclude
making these concessions.
Probably this recognition and pressure from inside the government from British business
circles lead Prime Minister May to stress in October 2016 that Britain would prioritise the
control of immigration over anything else and therefore it is ready to withdraw from the EU
without an agreement and fall back on the terms which the WTO agreement proposes,
a  withdrawal that is called ‘hard Brexit’ by the newspapers A hard Brexit is any form of
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withdrawal from the EU by the UK in which the UK leaves the single market and, therefore, its
economy and primarily its services sectors is open to losses. Donald Tusk is of the opinion that
a soft Brexit does not exist and a soft-hard dichotomy is a fallacy. He tweeted, following a con -
ference by the European Policy Centre on October 13 2016,10 that ‘…the only real alternative to
a “hard Brexit” is “no Brexit”. Even if today hardly anyone believes in such a possibility.’11
Anyway, it is too early to say whether some or all of the campaign promises or the promises
made by the Prime Minister in the autumn of 2016 will make it into the policy brief that will
determine the negotiating position of the UK. It is not by chance that the UK itself is likely to
want to leave – as we now know – by the end of March 2017 to give it time to devise its
negotiating positions and submit its withdrawal.
III Options for a Withdrawal
As outlined above, a withdrawal could take several forms of the options covered in this paper.
These options can be positioned next to one another on an imaginary ‘soft Brexit-hard Brexit’
axis, mainly by taking into account the EU policies in which that the UK probably wishes to
continue to participate, and the institutional consequences of such participation. As discussed
widely in public by the academic community and in the press, the available options include
solutions such as the ‘Norwegian model’, the ‘Swiss model’, the ‘Turkish model’, a free trade
agreement (FTA) or trade governed by WTO rules or an á la carte relationship with the EU.
The implementation of these options – except for ‘relationship á la carte’ – are either based
on existing international instruments or on examples that are already present in the external
economic relations of the EU (as their names show). The ‘Norwegian model’ requires EFTA
and EEA, while other solutions may be based on the existing free trade agreements of the EU
and its Member States, or the ones that are currently being negotiated. A Turkish model is an
‘association’ type agreement, creating a customs union and, finally, the so-called ‘á la carte
relationship’ is based on a relatively new set of standards of cooperation between the EU and
a third state.
Another aspect is that, apart from the conclusion of a WT, most of the options require that
the UK enters into further international arrangements, either with the EU only and/or its
member states and/or with certain other states, such as the EFTA and the EAA states. It is only
the ‘hardest’ Brexit that is based on the provisions of the existing multilateral framework of
international trade, i.e. the WTO, even though it is unclear whether the ‘re-accession’ of the
UK to the WTO would be a simple technical issue or a result of complex negotiations.12
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In this section, we shall review the various options the UK faces concerning the next steps
following its withdrawal from the EU.
1 The Norwegian Model 
The Norwegian model is the ‘softest’ Brexit of all the existing options – provided that the ‘no
Brexit at all’ case is left out from the available possibilities and – consequently – the one that
keeps the deepest level of economic integration between the EU and the UK. 
The implementation of the Norwegian model would require the accession of the UK to the
EAA. This necessitates the approval of the parties to the EAA, namely the EU, its member states
and other parties to the EAA, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway. The current setup of the EAA
also presupposes that the ‘re-accession’ of the UK to the EFTA, which it left upon its accession
to the EC back in 1973, would require, in addition, the approval of Switzerland.
An EAA-based integration would bring together the EU Member States, the three EEA States
and the UK in a single market, ensuring all the four freedoms of the EU, that is the free movement
of goods, persons, capital and the freedom of establishment. It would not include, however, the
common trade, agricultural and fishery policy, does not create a customs union and shall not
extend to monetary union. Naturally, it covers neither the CFSP nor justice and home affairs.
From an institutional point of view, as a Member of the EAA, the UK would be subject to
the EAA institutions, including the EAA Court, when implementing (or failing to implement)
the relevant EU-originated legislation. That is comparable to the control exercised by the Court
of Justice over the acts of the UK as an EU member state. More importantly, in the areas covered
by the EAA single market rules, the UK (with other EFTA members) would be more or less left
out of the law-making process, which is a situation much less disadvantageous than that of an
EU member state.
A further discouraging factor is that, even though the EAA has functioned for more than
20 years since 1994, neither the EU nor the EFTA parties seem entirely satisfied with it. The
Council has recently expressed its discontent with implementation of the relevant EU legislation
within the EAA and called for actively working towards a  sustainable and streamlined
incorporation and application of EEA-relevant legislation.13 The EFTA parties, in turn, complain
that the EU does not sufficiently take their interests and their constitutional problems into
account.14 This is adequately illustrated by various quotes from Norwegian politicians such as
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membership. Last accessed: November 24, 2016.
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the EU spokesman for the Norwegian Conservative Party, Nikolai Astrup: ‘If you want to run the
EU, stay in the EU. If you want to be run by the EU, feel free to join us in the EEA’15. For the sake
of completeness, it worth adding that these ideas are not shared unanimously: some
commentators highlight that EFTA parties do have effective ways to influence EAA relevant
legislation and they are able to achieve meaningful exemptions from EU legislation applicable
in the EAA territory.16
Be that as it may, the above characteristics of the Norwegian model hardly fit into the
political requirements relating to the future status of the UK as expressed by the majority of
Brexiteers. First and foremost, a strict limitation and control of migration of EU workers, which
was part of the main focus of the Brexit campaign, is not compatible with the EAA. Similarly,
the ‘outside’ legal control exercised by the EEA Surveillance Authority and the EAA Court over
the UK in the EAA context seems not to correspond to the ‘restoration’ of UK sovereignty
sought by the supporters of Brexit either. Also, based on the example of Norway, EAA parties
are bound to contribute to the EU via the EAA funds that could represent a burden at least
comparable to the current contribution of the UK to the EU.17
The Norwegian option is not necessarily capable of ensuring the economic advantages
that its protagonists expect. For example, the lack of a customs union and the corresponding
reestablishment of the customs borders could significantly hinder the operation of the free
movement of goods (by increasing the costs of the enterprises) when compared to the current
situation. Another structural problem with the EAA is that the current advantages enjoyed by
the UK in the EU single market are only replicated in the EAA if they are duly introduced by all
EAA members. Taking into account the important backlog of implementation that exists today,
EAA-based market access for UK producers could be significantly limited when compared to
the current situation.18
Although the relatively ‘deep’ continued integration of the UK into the EU, seemingly
implied by the Norwegian model, might seem appealing to those willing to mitigate the effects
of the Brexit and/or to maintain close integration, it does not correspond to the political
cornerstones placed by the Brexit campaign and may also be disappointing from the perspective
of preserving the economic advantages of integration.
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16 Safe harbour: why the Norway option could take the risk out of Brexit. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/
2016/06/18/safe-harbour-why-the-norway-option-could-take-the-risk-out-of-br/.
17 See (n 14) p. 12.
18 Ibid p. 12.
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2 The Swiss Model 
The UK could structure a withdrawal treaty in order to implement a solution similar to the
Swiss model of relations with the EU. 
The relationship between Switzerland and the EU may have seemed promising to Brexiteers
because it is largely based on classic international law; the framework is constituted by over
a hundred sectoral international agreements (which will clearly not be the case between the
EU and the UK.). EU-Swiss relations are somewhat looser than those the EU has with EEA
members, in the sense that Switzerland is also not legally bound by judgments of the European
Court of Justice and there is no court overseeing EU-Swiss relations while the EEA EFTA
disputes are decided by an EFTA Court. 
Yet, in reality Switzerland has to catch up with EU regulations and directives and has to
incorporate those into its domestic legal order and de facto has to follow their interpretation by
the ECJ in order to access the EU single market of goods. Moreover, the Swiss sectoral
agreements with the EU do not cover services in general and financial services in particular.
There is only an odd agreement on life insurance applicable in this sector. In that sense, the
Swiss model cannot serve as an example for the UK as a substantial part of British trade is in
services and Switzerland also has to contribute financially to the EU budget. 
Moreover, it will be difficult to pursue the Swiss model as a model for the UK because the
EU is dissatisfied with the state of its relationship with Switzerland and wants to reform it. In
December 2010, the EU’s Council of Ministers described these relations as ‘not ensuring the
necessary homogeneity’, and causing ‘legal uncertainty’. It added that this system ‘has become
complex and unwieldy to manage and has clearly reached its limits’.19 In December 2012, the
Council reaffirmed that ‘further steps are necessary in order to ensure the homogeneous
interpretation and application of the Internal Market rules’, and that it would seek a ‘legally
binding mechanism’ to make Switzerland sign up to revised laws, as well as ‘international
mechanisms for surveillance and judicial control’.20
Then, in February 2014, the Swiss people, based on a legally-binding initiative, decided in
a referendum that some form of quotas be placed on immigration from the EU.21 Switzerland
has until February 2017 to implement the results of the 2014 referendum. Based on the results
of the referendum, the Swiss government announced that it would not allow free movement of
persons with Croatia. Introducing such curbs as required by the referendum and the Swiss
government’s own initiative would contravene the EU’s principle of free movement of people,
to which Switzerland must adhere.
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The EU rejected that move. It also rejected a subsequent proposal that Switzerland should
be able to impose quantitative limits on a surge of immigrants from EU countries.22
The dispute over the free movement of persons led the EU to review the entire legal
framework of bilateral agreements with Switzerland, and the Council of Ministers decided, in
May 2014, to mandate the Commission to launch negotiations with Switzerland on ‘an
international agreement on an institutional framework governing bilateral relations with the
Swiss Confederation’.23
If concluded, such a new agreement would impose much stricter legal obligations related
to the internal market on Switzerland than those of the EEA EFTA members. If the Council
mandate is implemented, then 
– the European Commission would monitor Switzerland’s application of the bilateral agree -
ments,
– the Commission would be given ‘investigatory and decision-making powers’ similar to those
over member-states when policing the single market,
– there would be a maximum time limit for Switzerland to implement EU laws, when they are
updated,
– the ECJ should have jurisdiction, and either the EU or Switzerland should be able to take
cases to the court ‘without the other party’s prior consent’. 
While these negotiations are continuing24 and it is not clear what sort of agreement will be
hammered out, it seems evident that the Swiss-model is not promising for the UK, in the sense
that the agreement as it is now may be past its prime and it is highly unlikely that the EU would
be amenable to conclude a Swiss-model agreement with the UK whilst it is in the process of
fundamentally reforming that agreement with Switzerland and wishes to take out all those
elements which may have seemed attractive for the Brexiteers when they brought up the Swiss
model in the first place. 
To sum up, the Swiss model is likely to be unsuitable for the British government as
a template for negotiations as 
– it would provide a partially hard Brexit, as it does not cover services in general and financial
services in particular,
– the Swiss model involves the free movement of EU citizens without a limit,
– following the Swiss model would involve contributions by the UK to the EU budget,
– the EU is unlikely to accept a new adherent to the Swiss model while it is in the process of
fundamentally renegotiating the archetype of this model.
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3 The Turkish Model 
Some Brexiteers during the referendum campaign mentioned the EU-Turkey association
agreement25 that includes a customs union as a desirable fall-back for Britain. 
If the UK entered into a Turkish type customs union with the EU, it would not be free to
adopt its own tariffs, because it would have to follow decisions on tariffs made by the EU. If the
UK and the EU were to agree jointly on the common external tariffs, this would no longer be
the Turkish-model. 
Besides, the Turkish model does not give Turkey full access to the EU’s internal market, as
it covers neither services nor the free movement of individuals, just the free movement of goods
and even this at a price. Under the EU-Turkey association agreement, Turkey accepts the EU’s
acquis communautaire, including regarding competition policy. 
In our view, under this model, the UK would not benefit from the free trade agreements
(FTA) the EU concluded or concludes. It was mentioned by several Turkish commentators that,
following the conclusion of the EU FTA with the Republic of Korea, Turkish exporters have not
gained access to the Korean market, while Korean exporters have access to the Turkish market.
Also, if the EU-US trade deal is agreed and the UK settled on the Turkish model, American
companies would have access to the UK market while the UK would not have access to US
markets.
To sum up, the Turkish model is also likely to be unsuitable for the British government as
a template for negotiations, as it does not cover services in general and financial services in
particular, would curtail UK sovereignty on trade policy and requires a partial acceptance of
EU jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it could be an attractive solution in the sense that it does not
involve the free movement of people and does not require a contribution to the EU budget.
4 Free Trade Agreement with the EU
Another option available is an FTA with the EU and, in the likely scenario that this would result
in a mixed agreement, its member states. This option is sufficiently flexible, as the treaty practice
of the EU in this field is changing. This flexibility however, means that it is difficult to identify
the main elements of a model contained in an FTA.
The existing agreement include various forms of agreement named, among others, as
association, stabilisation, free trade or partnership and cooperation agreements with countries
all over the world including in particular Europe, the Mediterranean but also other African and
South American states. Association and free trade agreements provide at least for the reduction
or abolition of custom tariffs and quotas in certain or most sectors of the economy, while some
cooperation agreements leave these barriers to trade unchanged. The cooperation under some
these agreements may serve as a  means for strengthening economic integration while
collaboration remains limited with other countries.
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Some recent free trade agreements however – that have not yet entered into force, some of
them not even signed, – intend to create the framework for a free trade area with only a limited
number of reserved sectors. These agreements also extend to areas going beyond free trade
and contain important provisions relating to market access, harmonisation of economic
regulations etc. The CETA with Canada or the dubious TTIP, and to lesser extent, the free trade
agreement with Singapore (EUSTA) and Vietnam are the examples of the evolution of the EU´s
free trade agreements. 
It is undoubted that the weight of the UK in the world economy and its relationship with
the EU would call for a  free trade or partnership agreement like the CETA or the TTIP.
Technically, the parties to an FTA are allowed to agree flexibly on what they deem important.
Under such an agreement, it would be possible to ensure a free trade area in the trade of goods
and even to various sectors of services, and it would be possible to achieve harmonisation of
market regulation (which as a starting point, exists in the EU-UK relationship). On the other
hand, an important obstacle to overcome is the complexity of such negotiations. Both the CETA
and the TTIP in particular illustrate these difficulties. It is therefore unlikely that a meaningful
FTA could be achieved within a reasonable deadline. 
5 The UK Falls Back on WTO Rules 
It was recently floated that if the UK cannot agree with the EU on some other form of ongoing
trade cooperation, it could simply fall back on WTO rules, which set limits on the maximum
tariffs that countries can apply to trade in goods. This solution was even mentioned as desirable
from the Brexiteers’ point of view. The apparent advantage of this solution would be that it
would not involve contributions by the UK to the EU budget and would allow the UK to
completely free itself from the jurisdiction of the Luxembourg court.
It seems though that it is here that any advantages stop. This would be one of the hardest
forms of Brexit, as it would not provide for the free movement of goods, services, capital or
people. The EU and its member-states would become third countries for the UK and vice-versa.
The UK would have to re-establish customs controls at borders with EU member-states,
including the border with the Republic of Ireland. A firm border between the Republic and
Northern Ireland could unravel the Good Friday Agreement, according to some sources.26
There was quite a bit of discussion as to how long it would take for the UK to sort out
details of its membership within the WTO, as it would still have to agree with the EU on its share
of tariff concessions made to the EU by third parties. Even so, after the UK becomes an
operational independent member of the WTO, it would find itself in a  relatively difficult
position. While up to 40% of its exports are targeted to the single market, it would find itself on
a par with China and the Russia as far as ease of access to the single market is concerned.
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26 Northern Ireland could veto Brexit, Belfast high court told: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
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under way over post-Brexit border controls: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/10/ireland-confirms-
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A lot of the British industries, such as car assembly plants and the car parts industry, would
be seriously hurt by tariffs. These supply chains would be disrupted if the UK fell back under
WTO rules and firms might decide to scale back or stop production in the UK if they could not
optimally reach the single market from their current factories. In addition to tariffs, non-tariff
barriers to trade, such as long waits at the border, could cause further disruption as the WTO
has had extremely modest results in reducing non-tariff barriers to trade in manufacturing or
trade in services.
Moreover, it is far from evident that the re-accession of the UK to the WTO that will be
formally required is going to be a simple, technical exercise, as some argue. Although the UK
is a WTO member, this membership is bundled with that of the EU and the purpose of the
negotiations with other WTO members would be to reinstate the ‘single’ and independent UK
membership. This exercise may lead to intense negotiations with several countries or group of
countries and may have an impact in the UK too, if important social groups find themselves in
a less favourable situation than before Brexit.27
A rather peculiar situation would arise as regards to those 60 or so free trade agreements
(FTAs) that cover about 35 per cent of world trade concluded by the EU that are ‘mixed
agreements’. These so-called ‘mixed agreements’ were concluded both by the EU and the UK,
because their content affects the EU’s exclusive competence and also some UK competences.
Because of its exclusive power on trade, the EU made commitments on trade in these
agreements. If the UK were no longer a member of the EU, the part on trade – services, such
as financial services – would no longer apply between the UK and the non-EU country that
had signed the agreement. The UK, therefore, would – based on the Vienna Convention of the
Law of Treaties – either end up with a large number of FTAs which no longer have an active part
on trade or no FTAs at all. It would have to start negotiating FTAs with third countries and try
to achieve, on its own, terms similar to the existing ones. That is unlikely, though. The UK alone
would have less clout than the EU as its imports and exports constitute roughly 20% of those
of the EU; no more. As such, it is likely to be forced to content itself with worse terms of market
access than those achieved by the EU or unequal market access, as with the China-Switzerland
FTA, concluded in 2013, where Switzerland has given China more access to its markets than vice
versa.28
Thus, for several years after Brexit, to say the least, British external trade would be negatively
affected. 
A long period of uncertainty would be weighing on Britain’s trade and inward foreign
investment, and this would affect economic growth. In the long run, one hopes, when bilateral
trade agreements between the UK and all its main partners, including of course the EU, come
into force, the situation will improve.
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28 Free Trade Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Swiss Confederation http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/
topic/enswiss.shtml.
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6 A Customised Solution
Many have come up with customised solutions for the UK. This would entail a solution that
is not based on pre-existing models and would be a UK-only model, which, therefore, would
take longer to negotiate as it could not be based on existing subsets of models. In trying to
have a customised solution, the UK is also running a risk. The EU has always been trying to have
certain objective models in place for external relations. If the UK is no trying to introduce a UK-
model, this could subvert existing models, especially the Swiss and the Turkish one and would,
therefore, create an even more complex set of negotiations.
Moreover, as has often been stated publicly in the almost half year since the referendum,
EU leaders are of the opinion that the UK must not benefit too much from its withdrawal29
from the EU because this would create a dangerous precedent and sort of a disintegrating force
for other member states.30
In a rather influential paper, Bruegel31 the think tank proposed a customized solution in
August 2016. The authors argued that none of the existing models of partnership with the EU
would be suitable for the UK. They proposed a  new form of collaboration, a  continental
partnership, which would considerably less deep than EU membership but somewhat closer
than a simple free-trade agreement. The proposed continental partnership would consist of the
UK participating in goods, services and capital mobility and to some extent in labour mobility.
The UK would participate in a  new system of inter-governmental decision-making and
enforcement of common rules to protect the homogeneity of the deeply integrated market. The
UK would have a say on EU policies but ultimate formal authority would remain with the EU.
According to and as a consequence of the proposal, there would a Europe with an inner circle,
the EU, and an outer circle with less integration for the UK and potentially for Turkey, Ukraine
and other countries. It appears that the paper was not warmly received and is not now
considered as a pattern for the solution of the UK’s dilemma.
In our view, the agreement ironed out in February 2016 between Donald Tusk and David
Cameron32 could partially be a basis for a blueprint for a custom-made solution. This solution
has already been considered acceptable by the other member states, so this could be a point of
departure for negotiations, even if in its earlier form it was voted down in the referendum. That
agreement provided for an ‘emergency brake’ on in-work benefits for up to four years if there
is pressure on a particular member state. This agreement would have indexed child benefit to
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29 Brexit: Francois Hollande demands UK pay heavy price for deciding to leave EU http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/uk/politics/brexit-hollande-france-uk-must-pay-price-eu-withdrawal-crisis-a7349756.html.
30 David Davis warns EU leaders not to go ahead with ‘punishment plan’ for Britain: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2016/10/10/theresa-may-brexit-talks-denmark-netherlands-live/.
31 Jean Pisai-Ferry, Norbert Röttgen, André Sapir, Paul Tucker And Guntram B. Wolff: Europe after Brexit: A proposal for
a continental partnership, http://bruegel.org/2016/08/europe-after-brexit-a-proposal-for-a-continental-partnership/.
32 Decision of the Heads of State or Government meeting within the European Council concerning a new settlement
for the United Kingdom within the European Union: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2716240-Brexit-
Deal.html.
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the level of the member state where the child resides. According to the agreement, member
states could take further action against sham marriages and fraudulent immigration claims.
Another idea recently touted is the ‘Canada-plus’ option,33 suggesting Britain could look to
replicate the free trade deal (CETA) hammered out over seven years by the EU and the North
American country. The plus would be the addition of services, especially of financial services.
If the UK was proposing taking the ‘Canada-plus’ option, at least a part of the negotiations could
be spared. David Davis, the new minister for Brexit, has called it the ‘perfect starting point for
our discussions with the Commission’. Earlier this year, Boris Johnson stated on Brexit that ‘we
can be like Canada’.34
The Canadians government officials seem a little sceptical as to how the UK could use
CETA as a model: ‘How they think CETA is the panacea, I’m confused,’ said one senior Canadian
government official who was deeply involved with the negotiations. “We still don’t get complete
access to the EU market35 the way the Brits currently have as a member state. So I don’t
understand this looking towards CETA as the answer to Brexit when they will be taking a 43-
year step backwards in terms of the current access they have to the European Union.’ 36
Canadians also think that the agreement cannot be replicated as the UK and Canada are two
different countries: ‘I honestly don’t know how it can be exactly replicated,’ said Sylvain
Charlebois, a professor at Dalhousie University in Halifax. ‘Gains are going to be different, stakes
are going to be different. And therefore the deal has to be different.’ 37
7 An Evaluation of the Options
It seems from the above that none of the existing models offers a solution which meets either
the Brexiteers’ campaign promises or the declared aims of the UK government. It appears that
none of the existing models may serve even as a  good point of departure for starting
negotiations.
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33 UK unlikely to stay in single market, Tory document suggests: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/nov/
28/uk-unlikely-to-stay-in-single-market-tory-document-suggests.
34 Canada’s trade deal with EU a model for Brexit? Not quite, insiders say https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2016/aug/15/brexit-canada-trade-deal-eu-model-next-steps; Britain must earn from the EU-Canada Ceta trade
deal saga https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/oct/29/britain-must-learn-from-the-eu-canada-ceta-trade-
deal-saga.
35 The agreement promises that around 98.6% of goods traded between Canada and the EU will be free of duty and
empowers regulatory bodies to accept the standards and tests carried out in each other’s jurisdictions. While the
trade deal aims to liberalize services, hundreds of exceptions are listed. Under CETA, Canada will have no hand in
setting EU regulations or formulating product standards and no access to the banking passport system that would
have allowed its banks and financial services to trade freely. The freedom of movement clauses are primarily focused
on businesspeople.
36 Canada’s trade deal with EU a model for Brexit? Not quite, insiders say, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
aug/15/brexit-canada-trade-deal-eu-model-next-steps;
37 Canada’s trade deal with EU a model for Brexit? Not quite, insiders say https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
aug/15/brexit-canada-trade-deal-eu-model-next-steps;
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Drawing 1. Alternatives for Britain
Table 1. Models and Brexit campaign promises
We suspect that the UK government probably has already drawn the conclusion that the
difference between the goals and reality are irreconcilable, and remaining in the single market
may prove unrealistic. This seems to be confirmed by a document photographed in the hands
































































































Norwegian model yes yes yes yes yes no 
Swiss model yes yes no no yes no 
Turkish model no yes no no no no 
WTO solution no no no no no no 
Customized solution no yes yes no no yes 
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to the Tory vice-chair Mark Field after a meeting at the Department for Exiting the European
Union, could be seen to say: ‘what’s the model? Have your cake and eat it.’38 The Times39
characterised the handwritten note as giving away the UK government’s duplicity in negotiations
and the facts that ‘ministers may be reluctant to compromise with EU’. The handwritten notes
also appear to rule out single market membership (the Norwegian option): ‘Why no Norway —
two elements — no ECJ intervention — we’re a rule-taker beyond our trade with Europe.
Unlikely to do internal market.’ 
As such at present, it appears that the UK may opt for a customised solution, which would
best reflect the UK’s policy goals (no free movement, no ECJ jurisdiction, and no contribution
to the EU budget) but which is outside the single market. In this case, the CETA agreement
may indeed serve as a point of departure, and access to the market in services would need to
be added on top of it. It is unclear what the UK plans to offer in order to seal the deal and gain
access to the EU market in services. It may be that the reference included in the above
handwritten note ‘Europe gets a good deal on security’ 40 wishes to suggest that the UK would
somehow top up the CETA deal on its side by UK concessions on security in exchange for UK
access to the services market. It is hard to assess how realistic this idea is.
IV Looking in Our Crystal Ball
Uncertainty is bad for business and the economy, and anything related to Brexit at the time of
writing is uncertain. 
(1) It is uncertain (but more likely than not) whether Brexit will happen at all. 
(2) It is not certain how it will happen, namely whether the Houses of Parliament will be
involved in the process and whether there will be a parliamentary decision or referendum
concerning the terms negotiated. It is also uncertain whether the UK will strive to conclude
a transitional arrangement before concluding a final agreement on exiting the EU.
(3) It is not certain when it will happen, namely whether the notice on withdrawal will be served
on the EU in March 2017 and whether the negotiating period will be a two year period or
it will be prolonged by a transitional agreement. 
(4) It is also uncertain whether the UK government will negotiate to customise for itself one of
the existing models or will try to negotiate a solution tailor-made for the UK or if it will exit
the EU by default. 
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38 UK unlikely to stay in single market, Tory document suggests: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/
nov/28/uk-unlikely-to-stay-in-single-market-tory-document-suggests.
39 ‘Have cake and eat it’ – aide reveals Brexit tactic Ministers may be reluctant to compromise with EU
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/have-cake-and-eat-it-aide-reveals-brexit-tactic-wrj58bjbn.
40 Ibid.
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ad 1) Ms. May and her government very clearly are of the opinion that Brexit must take place, as
the referendum has decided on the exit of the UK (‘Brexit means Brexit’) from the EU and the
question is merely how and when. Ms. May seems to be of the opinion that Brexit must take
place whatever the consequences may be. On the other hand, according to former Prime Minister
John Major, there is a ‘perfectly credible1 case for a second referendum on leaving the European
Union.41 Former Prime Minister Tony Blair said in an interview that he was not predicting Brexit
would not happen, only that there was a possibility it would not. ‘It can be stopped if the British
people decide that, having seen what it means, the pain-gain, cost-benefit analysis doesn’t stack
up. And that can happen in one of two ways. I’m not saying it will [be stopped], by the way, but
it could. I’m just saying: until you see what it means, how do you know?’42
I am currently of the opinion that if an Article 50 notice on withdrawal is made then
withdrawal will take place, whether through an agreement of through the passage of time. In that
sense, the question is whether the notice on withdrawal will be served or not.
ad 2) Given the decision of the High Court43 on the need to involve Parliament in the withdrawal
of the UK from the EU and the expected decision on appeal by the Supreme Court, the Houses of
Parliament will likely be involved in and have a decisive say in the UK’s decision on withdrawal
and probably also in the negotiations with the EU. If Parliament is involved in the political
process of the withdrawal under Article 50 of the TEU and with the preparation of the exit
strategy then the UK may not file its withdrawal notice in March 2017 or may not file it at all.
This may lead at some point to snap elections in the UK, as the UK cannot leave the EU in
limbo for ever even if the unfortunate wording of Article 50 of the TEU makes the EU a hostage
of the departing member state. If the snap elections would result in a Parliament with a very
different composition and in a clear mandate for exit or remain, this may lead to the UK deciding
on filing a notice on withdrawal under Article 50 of the TEU or not filing it at all.
Even if the EU leaders now are of the opinion that there can be no negotiations before the
withdrawal notice is submitted44 and the UK government was also of this opinion before the
referendum,45 it may be that Angela Merkel – who emerges somehow as the only European
authority on Brexit – would somehow give a sign to the UK that the EU is ready for transitional
arrangements46 as the two year withdrawal period is insufficient for creating a satisfactory new
regime for UK-EU relations.
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41 John Major: case for second Brexit referendum is credible, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/
nov/25/brexit-sir-john-major-says-perfectly-credible-case-for-second-referendum.
42 http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2016/11/tony-blair-s-unfinished-business
43 The Queen on the application of (1) Gina Miller & (2) Deir Tozetti Dos Santos vThe Secretary of State for Exiting the
European Union, (1) Grahame Pigney & Others, (2) AB, KK, PR and Children – Interested Parties Mr George Birnie
& Others – Interveners [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) Case No. CO/3809/2016 and CO/3281/2016 3 November
2016 https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/r-miller-v-secretary-of-state-for-exiting-the-european-union/.
44 Brexit: Germany rules out informal negotiations see: www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36637232.
45 See: The process for withdrawing from the European Union see: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/504216/The_process_for_withdrawing_from_the_EU_print_ready.pdf.
46 May hints at transition deal on Brexit to avoid ‘cliff edge’ for business https://www.theguardian.com/business/
2016/nov/21/government-working-hard-avoid-brexit-cliff-edge-business-theresa-may-cbi.
ELJ_2016-1__0  2017.03.13.  17:53  Page 90
ad 3) Given the uncertainty as to the role of Parliament and the flexibility of the EU, it is not clear
when the negotiations would start, how long those negotiations would last and when they would
end.
ad 4) Most important of all, it is unclear what the negotiating aims and strategy of the UK are.
The stated aim of the UK government is to get maximum access to the single market with
a minimum or no freedom of movement, no payment to the EU and no acceptance of the
jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice. According to former Prime Minister Blair, attempting to
secure access to the single market will be the defining negotiation. “Either you get maximum
access to the single market – in which case you’ll end up accepting a significant number of the
rules on immigration, on payment into the budget, on the European Court’s jurisdiction. People
may then say, ‘Well, hang on, why are we leaving then?’ Or alternatively, you’ll be out of the
single market and the economic pain may be very great, because beyond doubt if you do that
you’ll have years, maybe a decade, of economic restructuring.’47
So it seems from the above and the analysis under Section 3 above that none of the existing
models offer anything similar to what the UK seems to want.48 The UK will therefore either
have a tailor-made solution or no solution at all and. if the UK submits its notice for withdrawal
under Article 50 of the TEU, at the end of the two year term it would likely exit by default and
without an agreement and it would simply fall back in international trade in goods and services
according to the WTO rules. With this potential outcome and the uncertainties attached, the
UK government has been forced to offer compensatory state aid for an industry and may be
forced to offer the same for others.49
Yet the outcome does not bode well for the UK or the EU as it seems that the UK
government is split and intellectually ill prepared50 and probably dishonest including the foreign
secretary, Boris Johnson who are ‘…saying things that are intellectually impossible, politically
unavailable, so … [are] … not offering the British people a fair view of what is available and
what can be achieved in these negotiations’.51
As to the next steps as they are visible at the time of writing, a lot may depend on the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case Miller & Tozetti Dos Santos -v- The Secretary of
State for Exiting the European Union52 as to whether the Houses of Parliament will be
implicated in the decision on the withdrawal or not. 
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47 http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2016/11/tony-blair-s-unfinished-business.
48 Brexit and beyond: how the United Kingdom might leave the European Union http://ukandeu.ac.uk/research-
papers/.
49 UK seeking tariff-free EU deal for carmakers, Nissan told https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/oct/30/
nissan-eu-tariff-free-brexit-sunderland.
50 According to a memo by Deloitte leaked to the press on November 6, 2017 ‘Despite extended debate among
permanent secretaries, no common strategy has emerged,’ http://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/cabinet-split-
threatens-to-derail-may-s-brexit-talks-hxfwmv2td.
51 European ministers ridicule Boris Johnson after prosecco claim, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/nov/
16/european-ministers-boris-johnson-prosecco-claim-brexit.
52 See above (n 42).
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Drawing 2. Likely timeline on Brexit
If the Houses of Parliament will participate in the decision-making, it may be difficult to
maintain Ms. May’s timetable and submit the withdrawal notice when she planned. More
importantly, the Parliament may also somehow prevent the government from submitting the
withdrawal notice to the EU at all, in which case snap elections are likely to be called. Based on
the snap elections, a new parliament with a different political make-up could be elected and
this could mean a new government, potentially with a different set of goals.
Our crystal ball has not yielded a clear prediction of what exactly will happen in the coming
twelve months. What is clear, it is as if the UK has stepped Through the Looking Glass53 and
from June 24 Brexiteers, Remainers and the entire EU and its population now found itself on
the other side, in a strange parallel, unsafe and mysterious world where clocks work backwards.
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